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	<br> Obviously, there are very different ways of reading the papers gathered in this book – readers may think of them as the revival of speculative thinking, tokens of fair academic debate, or mere hypotheses that still need to be proved. It is far from my intention to prevent any of these views from being held. However, it is my intention that these texts, forming as they do a network of ideas currently under discussion, should be read as putting forward a very basic point. This point concerns the fact that any understanding or definition of consciousness is always founded on a specific vocabulary, and relies heavily on the technologies that make metaphors available with which to represent consciousness. I do not mean by this that there is a literal fact about consciousness that technology and its related vocabularies and metaphors refer to. It is rather that what we are faced with when we consider different discourses about consciousness is a complex set of techno-linguistic mediations that do not yield any conclusive literal content that makes it possible to resolve, once and for all, the debate over the nature of consciousness. <br><br> The papers gathered here come from a number of different authors – ranging from senior researchers to a student newly graduated. The aim of this range is to show the sheer variety of vocabularies that are currently being adopted to address issues of consciousness. The chosen papers are organized into four sections. 'The Riddle of Consciousness' provides an introduction to some of the different approaches to consciousness and its related problems – the mind-body relationship, qualia, reductionism, etc. Velmans’ article is a broad and well documented presentation of the various theories that purport to define consciousness and its limitations. Robinson welcomes ‘Global Workspace’ as a promising neurological explanation of consciousness as ‘synchronized brain activity’. Finally, Soren considers John Searle’s materialist approach to consciousness and, in doing so, reviews the reach and shortcomings of different sorts of materialism proposed in the last fifty years. <br><br> The second section deals with the representation of consciousness. How do scans and digital technologies make consciousness available for research? How is consciousness measured? There is a set of technologies that are most celebrated and discussed in the task of representing consciousness – especially Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), but also Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and Electroencephalography (EEG). The piece by Guenedi ''et al''. is an attempt to represent ‘body possession’ through fMRI. The articles by Lundervold and Stam & Reijneveld rely on a hard mathematical apparatus, but this does not prevent them from producing arguments accessible to the non-specialist. In both cases, fMRI is considered as a successful tool to map brain connectivity and to represent the brain’s complex networks. What do all these images tell us about consciousness? <br><br> The book’s third section deals with the idea of 'Extended Consciousness'. There is a recent trend in Western academia that favours an extended notion of consciousness – i.e. the conviction that consciousness does not happen in the brain but in a complex set of interconnections with the techno-biological environment. Powerful hypotheses of this sort have been gathering momentum. If life itself has evolved from inorganic matter, could consciousness not have come to exist in a similar way over the course of the larger picture of human evolution? This has been the question asked by quantum physicists seeking to determine the origin of consciousness. It is remarkable how certain representations recently developed from quantum physics have turned towards a kind of materialist pan-psychologism in which not just the brain but the whole of nature and the universe is actually conscious. Quantum physics can thus be seen to be overcoming the divide between res extensa and res cogitans in its substituting of matter for energy as the source of life and consciousness. With this vocabulary in hand, some quite surprising hypotheses – at least as far as Western scientific thought is concerned –<br>have been put forward. It is in this line of work that both Zhang’s and Grover’s articles are to be located. Meanwhile, a somewhat different tone is adopted in the piece by Randrup, where he contends that a group of humans and animals can be seen as the subject of collective conscious experiences. Consequently, he proceeds to argue for an overcoming of ideas of consciousness as a mere attribute of individuals. <br><br> Finally, in the Appendix I present a number of different cases in which conscious experiences manifest themselves – be it in writing, music, dance or blogging. What I am seeking to show are the experimental ways in which conscious is expressed; that is, the ways in which the dominant hegemonic forms of consciousness are undermined by other forms of experience. I am very much interested here in the expression of altered states of consciousness, mainly by drug use. I intend this Appendix to be a work-in-progress that will be added to and developed further as I gather new material. So far, it contains one piece: an argument put forward by David W. Hill in which he explains why he stopped using Facebook. It addresses the question: What sort of awareness did Facebook provoke in Hill that led him to this dramatic gesture? <br>'''<br> Endnotes '''<br><br> <sup>1</sup> Among the classic texts I suggest should be reviewed are Churchland (1995), Clark (2003, 2008), Dennett (1996), Donald (1993), McGinn (1991), Nagel (1981), Pepperell (2003) and Searle (1992). There are numerous Readers I find valuable, including Schneider and Velmans (2007). This introduction assumes at least in part a dialogue with these texts.		<br> Obviously, there are very different ways of reading the papers gathered in this book – readers may think of them as the revival of speculative thinking, tokens of fair academic debate, or mere hypotheses that still need to be proved. It is far from my intention to prevent any of these views from being held. However, it is my intention that these texts, forming as they do a network of ideas currently under discussion, should be read as putting forward a very basic point. This point concerns the fact that any understanding or definition of consciousness is always founded on a specific vocabulary, and relies heavily on the technologies that make metaphors available with which to represent consciousness. I do not mean by this that there is a literal fact about consciousness that technology and its related vocabularies and metaphors refer to. It is rather that what we are faced with when we consider different discourses about consciousness is a complex set of techno-linguistic mediations that do not yield any conclusive literal content that makes it possible to resolve, once and for all, the debate over the nature of consciousness. <br><br> The papers gathered here come from a number of different authors – ranging from senior researchers to a student newly graduated. The aim of this range is to show the sheer variety of vocabularies that are currently being adopted to address issues of consciousness. The chosen papers are organized into four sections. 'The Riddle of Consciousness' provides an introduction to some of the different approaches to consciousness and its related problems – the mind-body relationship, qualia, reductionism, etc. Velmans’ article is a broad and well documented presentation of the various theories that purport to define consciousness and its limitations. Robinson welcomes ‘Global Workspace’ as a promising neurological explanation of consciousness as ‘synchronized brain activity’. Finally, Soren considers John Searle’s materialist approach to consciousness and, in doing so, reviews the reach and shortcomings of different sorts of materialism proposed in the last fifty years. <br><br> The second section deals with the representation of consciousness. How do scans and digital technologies make consciousness available for research? How is consciousness measured? There is a set of technologies that are most celebrated and discussed in the task of representing consciousness – especially Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), but also Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and Electroencephalography (EEG). The piece by Guenedi ''et al''. is an attempt to represent ‘body possession’ through fMRI. The articles by Lundervold and Stam & Reijneveld rely on a hard mathematical apparatus, but this does not prevent them from producing arguments accessible to the non-specialist. In both cases, fMRI is considered as a successful tool to map brain connectivity and to represent the brain’s complex networks. What do all these images tell us about consciousness? <br><br> The book’s third section deals with the idea of 'Extended Consciousness'. There is a recent trend in Western academia that favours an extended notion of consciousness – i.e. the conviction that consciousness does not happen in the brain but in a complex set of interconnections with the techno-biological environment. Powerful hypotheses of this sort have been gathering momentum. If life itself has evolved from inorganic matter, could consciousness not have come to exist in a similar way over the course of the larger picture of human evolution? This has been the question asked by quantum physicists seeking to determine the origin of consciousness. It is remarkable how certain representations recently developed from quantum physics have turned towards a kind of materialist pan-psychologism in which not just the brain but the whole of nature and the universe is actually conscious. Quantum physics can thus be seen to be overcoming the divide between res extensa and res cogitans in its substituting of matter for energy as the source of life and consciousness. With this vocabulary in hand, some quite surprising hypotheses – at least as far as Western scientific thought is concerned –<br>have been put forward. It is in this line of work that both Zhang’s and Grover’s articles are to be located. Meanwhile, a somewhat different tone is adopted in the piece by Randrup, where he contends that a group of humans and animals can be seen as the subject of collective conscious experiences. Consequently, he proceeds to argue for an overcoming of ideas of consciousness as a mere attribute of individuals. <br><br> Finally, in the Appendix I present a number of different cases in which conscious experiences manifest themselves – be it in writing, music, dance or blogging. What I am seeking to show are the experimental ways in which conscious is expressed; that is, the ways in which the dominant hegemonic forms of consciousness are undermined by other forms of experience. I am very much interested here in the expression of altered states of consciousness, mainly by drug use. I intend this Appendix to be a work-in-progress that will be added to and developed further as I gather new material. So far, it contains one piece: an argument put forward by David W. Hill in which he explains why he stopped using Facebook. It addresses the question: What sort of awareness did Facebook provoke in Hill that led him to this dramatic gesture? <br>'''<br> Endnotes '''<br><br> <sup>1</sup> Among the classic texts I suggest should be reviewed are Churchland (1995), Clark (2003, 2008), Dennett (1996), Donald (1993), McGinn (1991), Nagel (1981), Pepperell (2003) and Searle (1992). There are numerous Readers I find valuable, including Schneider and Velmans (2007). This introduction assumes at least in part a dialogue with these texts.

	<br> '''References <br>'''<br> Churchland, P. M. (1995) ''Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2003) ''Natural-Born Cyborgs. Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence''. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2008) ''Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension''. Oxford University Press. <br><br> Dennett, D. (1996) ''Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness''. New York, NY: Basic Books. <br><br> Donald, M. (1991) ''Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and ~~Cognitio'n~~''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. <br><br> Harnard, S. (2005) ‘Reply to John Searle: What Is Consciousness?’, ''New York Review of Books'', June 23, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/jun/23/what-is-consciousness/, retrieved August 13th 2011. <br><br> Nagel, T. (1986) ''The View from Nowhere''. New York: Oxford University Press~~. <br><br> Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (2007) ''The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness''. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers~~. <br><br> MacGinn, C. (1991) ''The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution''. London: Basil Blackwell. <br><br> Pepperell, R. (2003) ''The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain''. Bristol: Intellect. <br><br> Putnam, H. (1981) ‘Brains in a Vat’, ''Reason, Truth and History''. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. <br><br> Searle, J. (1992) ''The Rediscovery of the Mind''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Virno, P. (2004) ''Grammar of the Multitude''. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).		<br> '''References <br>'''<br> Churchland, P. M. (1995) ''Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2003) ''Natural-Born Cyborgs. Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence''. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2008) ''Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension''. Oxford University Press. <br><br> Dennett, D. (1996) ''Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness''. New York, NY: Basic Books. <br><br> Donald, M. (1991) ''Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. <br><br> Harnard, S. (2005) ‘Reply to John Searle: What Is Consciousness?’, ''New York Review of Books'', June 23, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/jun/23/what-is-consciousness/, retrieved August 13th 2011. <br><br> Nagel, T. (1986) ''The View from Nowhere''. New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> MacGinn, C. (1991) ''The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution''. London: Basil Blackwell. <br><br> Pepperell, R. (2003) ''The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain''. Bristol: Intellect. <br><br> Putnam, H. (1981) ‘Brains in a Vat’, ''Reason, Truth and History''. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. <br><br> Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (2007) ''The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness''. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. <br><br> Searle, J. (1992) ''The Rediscovery of the Mind''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Virno, P. (2004) ''Grammar of the Multitude''. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).

Joanna at 10:24, 1 October 2011

2011-10-01T10:24:41Z

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	[http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/The_Mediations_of_Consciousness Back to the book]		[http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/The_Mediations_of_Consciousness Back to the book]
	~~<br>~~<br>		<br>
	= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =		= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =
	<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>		<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>

Joanna at 10:24, 1 October 2011

2011-10-01T10:24:30Z

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			[http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/The_Mediations_of_Consciousness Back to the book]
			<br><br>
	= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =		= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =
	<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>		<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>

Joanna at 08:44, 16 September 2011

2011-09-16T08:44:16Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:44, 16 September 2011
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	<br> The point Virno is calling attention to is that what Marx understood to be knowledge accumulated in machines as general intellect is today located in the very lives and bodies of workers. Knowledge, subjective experience and mindsets join the process of production set in motion by post-Fordism. If we follow Merlin Donald and Andy Clark’s arguments regarding the plasticity of the brain and the constitutive reliance of the mind upon sign and memory technologies, then the question of the constitution of consciousness can hardly be answered by pointing to the firing of complex networks of neurons alone. Instead, consciousness appears inextricably constituted by politics, technology and the social workforce. At the same time, this approach certainly provides no definitive answers as far as the philosophical and scientific riddles of consciousness are concerned. Rather, it reminds us that a single straight answer will not be able to account for the multiple mediations in which consciousness is formed. <br><br>                                                                                                                                                                     ***		<br> The point Virno is calling attention to is that what Marx understood to be knowledge accumulated in machines as general intellect is today located in the very lives and bodies of workers. Knowledge, subjective experience and mindsets join the process of production set in motion by post-Fordism. If we follow Merlin Donald and Andy Clark’s arguments regarding the plasticity of the brain and the constitutive reliance of the mind upon sign and memory technologies, then the question of the constitution of consciousness can hardly be answered by pointing to the firing of complex networks of neurons alone. Instead, consciousness appears inextricably constituted by politics, technology and the social workforce. At the same time, this approach certainly provides no definitive answers as far as the philosophical and scientific riddles of consciousness are concerned. Rather, it reminds us that a single straight answer will not be able to account for the multiple mediations in which consciousness is formed. <br><br>                                                                                                                                                                     ***

	<br> Obviously, there are very different ways of reading the papers gathered in this book – readers may think of them as the revival of speculative thinking, tokens of fair academic debate, or mere hypotheses that still need to be proved. It is far from my intention to prevent any of these views from being held. However, it is my intention that these texts, forming as they do a network of ideas currently under discussion, should be read as putting forward a very basic point. This point concerns the fact that any understanding or definition of consciousness is always founded on a specific vocabulary, and relies heavily on the technologies that make metaphors available with which to represent consciousness. I do not mean by this that there is a literal fact about consciousness that technology and its related vocabularies and metaphors refer to. It is rather that what we are faced with when we consider different discourses about consciousness is a complex set of techno-linguistic mediations that do not yield any conclusive literal content that makes it possible to resolve, once and for all, the debate over the nature of consciousness. <br><br> The papers gathered here come from a number of different authors – ranging from senior researchers to a student newly graduated. The aim of this range is to show the sheer variety of vocabularies that are currently being adopted to address issues of consciousness. The chosen papers are organized into four sections. 'The Riddle of Consciousness' provides an introduction to some of the different approaches to consciousness and its related problems – the mind-body relationship, qualia, reductionism, etc. Velmans’ article is a broad and well documented presentation of the various theories that purport to define consciousness and its limitations. Robinson welcomes ‘Global Workspace’ as a promising neurological explanation of consciousness as ‘synchronized brain activity’. Finally, Soren considers John Searle’s materialist approach to consciousness and, in doing so, reviews the reach and shortcomings of different sorts of materialism proposed in the last fifty years. <br><br> The second section deals with the representation of consciousness. How do scans and digital technologies make consciousness available for research? How is consciousness measured? There is a set of technologies that are most celebrated and discussed in the task of representing consciousness – especially Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), but also Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and Electroencephalography (EEG). The piece by Guenedi ''et al''. is an attempt to represent ‘body possession’ through fMRI. The articles by Lundervold and Stam & Reijneveld rely on a hard mathematical apparatus, but this does not prevent them from producing arguments accessible to the non-specialist. In both cases, fMRI is considered as a successful tool to map brain connectivity and to represent the brain’s complex networks. What do all these images tell us about consciousness? <br><br> The book’s third section deals with the idea of 'Extended Consciousness'. There is a recent trend in Western academia that favours an extended notion of consciousness – i.e. the conviction that consciousness does not happen in the brain but in a complex set of interconnections with the techno-biological environment. Powerful hypotheses of this sort have been gathering momentum. If life itself has evolved from inorganic matter, could consciousness not have come to exist in a similar way over the course of the larger picture of human evolution? This has been the question asked by quantum physicists seeking to determine the origin of consciousness. It is remarkable how certain representations recently developed from quantum physics have turned towards a kind of materialist pan-psychologism in which not just the brain but the whole of nature and the universe is actually conscious. Quantum physics can thus be seen to be overcoming the divide between res extensa and res cogitans in its substituting of matter for energy as the source of life and consciousness. With this vocabulary in hand, some quite surprising hypotheses – at least as far as Western scientific thought is concerned –<br>have been put forward. It is in this line of work that both Zhang’s and Grover’s articles are to be located. Meanwhile, a somewhat different tone is adopted in the piece by Randrup, where he contends that a group of humans and animals can be seen as the subject of collective conscious experiences. Consequently, he proceeds to argue for an overcoming of ideas of consciousness as a mere attribute of individuals. <br><br> Finally, in the Appendix I present a number of different cases in which conscious experiences manifest themselves – be it in writing, music, dance or blogging. What I am seeking to show are the experimental ways in which conscious is expressed; that is, the ways in which the dominant hegemonic forms of consciousness are undermined by other forms of experience. I am very much interested here in the expression of altered states of consciousness, mainly by drug use. I intend this Appendix to be a work-in-progress that will be added to and developed further as I gather new material. So far, it contains ~~two pieces. The first, by Ma, is a classic consideration of James Joyce and Virginia Wolf’s representation of stream of consciousness in literature. The second is~~ an argument put forward by David W. Hill in which he explains why he stopped using Facebook. It addresses the question: What sort of awareness did Facebook provoke in Hill that led him to this dramatic gesture? <br>'''<br> Endnotes '''<br><br> <sup>1</sup> Among the classic texts I suggest should be reviewed are Churchland (1995), Clark (2003, 2008), Dennett (1996), Donald (1993), McGinn (1991), Nagel (1981), Pepperell (2003) and Searle (1992). There are numerous Readers I find valuable, including Schneider and Velmans (2007). This introduction assumes at least in part a dialogue with these texts.		<br> Obviously, there are very different ways of reading the papers gathered in this book – readers may think of them as the revival of speculative thinking, tokens of fair academic debate, or mere hypotheses that still need to be proved. It is far from my intention to prevent any of these views from being held. However, it is my intention that these texts, forming as they do a network of ideas currently under discussion, should be read as putting forward a very basic point. This point concerns the fact that any understanding or definition of consciousness is always founded on a specific vocabulary, and relies heavily on the technologies that make metaphors available with which to represent consciousness. I do not mean by this that there is a literal fact about consciousness that technology and its related vocabularies and metaphors refer to. It is rather that what we are faced with when we consider different discourses about consciousness is a complex set of techno-linguistic mediations that do not yield any conclusive literal content that makes it possible to resolve, once and for all, the debate over the nature of consciousness. <br><br> The papers gathered here come from a number of different authors – ranging from senior researchers to a student newly graduated. The aim of this range is to show the sheer variety of vocabularies that are currently being adopted to address issues of consciousness. The chosen papers are organized into four sections. 'The Riddle of Consciousness' provides an introduction to some of the different approaches to consciousness and its related problems – the mind-body relationship, qualia, reductionism, etc. Velmans’ article is a broad and well documented presentation of the various theories that purport to define consciousness and its limitations. Robinson welcomes ‘Global Workspace’ as a promising neurological explanation of consciousness as ‘synchronized brain activity’. Finally, Soren considers John Searle’s materialist approach to consciousness and, in doing so, reviews the reach and shortcomings of different sorts of materialism proposed in the last fifty years. <br><br> The second section deals with the representation of consciousness. How do scans and digital technologies make consciousness available for research? How is consciousness measured? There is a set of technologies that are most celebrated and discussed in the task of representing consciousness – especially Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), but also Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and Electroencephalography (EEG). The piece by Guenedi ''et al''. is an attempt to represent ‘body possession’ through fMRI. The articles by Lundervold and Stam & Reijneveld rely on a hard mathematical apparatus, but this does not prevent them from producing arguments accessible to the non-specialist. In both cases, fMRI is considered as a successful tool to map brain connectivity and to represent the brain’s complex networks. What do all these images tell us about consciousness? <br><br> The book’s third section deals with the idea of 'Extended Consciousness'. There is a recent trend in Western academia that favours an extended notion of consciousness – i.e. the conviction that consciousness does not happen in the brain but in a complex set of interconnections with the techno-biological environment. Powerful hypotheses of this sort have been gathering momentum. If life itself has evolved from inorganic matter, could consciousness not have come to exist in a similar way over the course of the larger picture of human evolution? This has been the question asked by quantum physicists seeking to determine the origin of consciousness. It is remarkable how certain representations recently developed from quantum physics have turned towards a kind of materialist pan-psychologism in which not just the brain but the whole of nature and the universe is actually conscious. Quantum physics can thus be seen to be overcoming the divide between res extensa and res cogitans in its substituting of matter for energy as the source of life and consciousness. With this vocabulary in hand, some quite surprising hypotheses – at least as far as Western scientific thought is concerned –<br>have been put forward. It is in this line of work that both Zhang’s and Grover’s articles are to be located. Meanwhile, a somewhat different tone is adopted in the piece by Randrup, where he contends that a group of humans and animals can be seen as the subject of collective conscious experiences. Consequently, he proceeds to argue for an overcoming of ideas of consciousness as a mere attribute of individuals. <br><br> Finally, in the Appendix I present a number of different cases in which conscious experiences manifest themselves – be it in writing, music, dance or blogging. What I am seeking to show are the experimental ways in which conscious is expressed; that is, the ways in which the dominant hegemonic forms of consciousness are undermined by other forms of experience. I am very much interested here in the expression of altered states of consciousness, mainly by drug use. I intend this Appendix to be a work-in-progress that will be added to and developed further as I gather new material. So far, it contains one piece: an argument put forward by David W. Hill in which he explains why he stopped using Facebook. It addresses the question: What sort of awareness did Facebook provoke in Hill that led him to this dramatic gesture? <br>'''<br> Endnotes '''<br><br> <sup>1</sup> Among the classic texts I suggest should be reviewed are Churchland (1995), Clark (2003, 2008), Dennett (1996), Donald (1993), McGinn (1991), Nagel (1981), Pepperell (2003) and Searle (1992). There are numerous Readers I find valuable, including Schneider and Velmans (2007). This introduction assumes at least in part a dialogue with these texts.

	<br> '''References <br>'''<br> Churchland, P. M. (1995) ''Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2003) ''Natural-Born Cyborgs. Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence''. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2008) ''Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension''. Oxford University Press. <br><br> Dennett, D. (1996) ''Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness''. New York, NY: Basic Books. <br><br> Donald, M. (1991) ''Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognitio'n''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. <br><br> Harnard, S. (2005) ‘Reply to John Searle: What Is Consciousness?’, ''New York Review of Books'', June 23, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/jun/23/what-is-consciousness/, retrieved August 13th 2011. <br><br> Nagel, T. (1986) ''The View from Nowhere''. New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (2007) ''The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness''. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. <br><br> MacGinn, C. (1991) ''The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution''. London: Basil Blackwell. <br><br> Pepperell, R. (2003) ''The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain''. Bristol: Intellect. <br><br> Putnam, H. (1981) ‘Brains in a Vat’, ''Reason, Truth and History''. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. <br><br> Searle, J. (1992) ''The Rediscovery of the Mind''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Virno, P. (2004) ''Grammar of the Multitude''. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).		<br> '''References <br>'''<br> Churchland, P. M. (1995) ''Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2003) ''Natural-Born Cyborgs. Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence''. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Clark, A. (2008) ''Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension''. Oxford University Press. <br><br> Dennett, D. (1996) ''Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness''. New York, NY: Basic Books. <br><br> Donald, M. (1991) ''Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognitio'n''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. <br><br> Harnard, S. (2005) ‘Reply to John Searle: What Is Consciousness?’, ''New York Review of Books'', June 23, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/jun/23/what-is-consciousness/, retrieved August 13th 2011. <br><br> Nagel, T. (1986) ''The View from Nowhere''. New York: Oxford University Press. <br><br> Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (2007) ''The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness''. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. <br><br> MacGinn, C. (1991) ''The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution''. London: Basil Blackwell. <br><br> Pepperell, R. (2003) ''The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain''. Bristol: Intellect. <br><br> Putnam, H. (1981) ‘Brains in a Vat’, ''Reason, Truth and History''. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. <br><br> Searle, J. (1992) ''The Rediscovery of the Mind''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <br><br> Virno, P. (2004) ''Grammar of the Multitude''. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).

Joanna at 20:50, 15 September 2011

2011-09-15T20:50:02Z

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Joanna at 19:23, 14 September 2011

2011-09-14T19:23:15Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:23, 14 September 2011
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	= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =		= '''<sup></sup>From the Brain to General Intellect: Commentary on the Mediations of Consciousness'''<br> Alberto López Cuenca <br><br> =
	<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>		<blockquote>‘The modern human mind is not a simple medieval clock; it is not a radio or telephone switchboard; it is not a system of clever software; and it is most definitely not a general-purpose computing device like a Turing machine. These things are its inventions, products of its culture. They are no more than the metaphors it currently uses when contemplating itself.’ (Merlin Donald, ''Origins of the Modern Mind'')</blockquote>
	<br> There is an overwhelming amount of literature about the nature of consciousness and its riddles. Yet one must necessarily work through this literature if one is interested in the philosophical and scientific details of the related debates. However, this means that this short book can be neither an exhaustive introduction nor a developed stance on the issue of consciousness – the problem of the mind-body relationship, the reduction of mental states to brain states, or the attribution of consciousness to single individuals. Something of that kind can be found elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> As far as these issues are concerned, this ~~book~~ is more of a call to pay attention to the current ways in which some of the scientific discussions about consciousness are framed. <br><br> Almost any introduction to the subject of consciousness holds that the philosophical history of the modern mind starts with the strict distinction René Descartes made between ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’. Here, a mental and a physical realm were established that are sharply separated from the one another while at the same time being weakly linked by the pineal gland - what Descartes thought to be the physical seat of the mind. This dualism set both the stage and the characters that have subsequently played out the still unfinished story of modern and contemporary consciousness. If these realms are so distinct, how can the mental affect the physical? On the other hand, if the mental is conditioned by the physical, how is free will possible? How can physical states of the brain account for such phenomenologically distinct states as mental ones? How can it be shown that accessible third person descriptions of physical facts are descriptions of inaccessible first person mental states? <br><br> As a result of developments in clinical psychology and neuroscience, the dominant trend throughout most of the 20th century has been to explain the nature of consciousness, not in terms of a dualism, but rather in terms of different sorts of materialism. Consciousness here is either reduced to, identified with, or caused by, brain states or neural connections. These various explanations converge on the basic point of making the brain a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness. However, a number of criticisms have been made of these forms of materialism. For example, if being in pain is identical to being in a certain brain state, why can’t the person in pain identify such a brain state? If the brain causes the mental state of anger, how can two such different conditions be related? Moreover, that the brain is in a certain state or neurons are connected in a determined way does not seem to explain how one feels what one feels. As Steven Harnard writes: <br><br>		<br> There is an overwhelming amount of literature about the nature of consciousness and its riddles. Yet one must necessarily work through this literature if one is interested in the philosophical and scientific details of the related debates. However, this means that this short book can be neither an exhaustive introduction nor a developed stance on the issue of consciousness – the problem of the mind-body relationship, the reduction of mental states to brain states, or the attribution of consciousness to single individuals. Something of that kind can be found elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> As far as these issues are concerned, this Living Book is more of a call to pay attention to the current ways in which some of the scientific discussions about consciousness are framed. <br><br> Almost any introduction to the subject of consciousness holds that the philosophical history of the modern mind starts with the strict distinction René Descartes made between ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’. Here, a mental and a physical realm were established that are sharply separated from the one another while at the same time being weakly linked by the pineal gland - what Descartes thought to be the physical seat of the mind. This dualism set both the stage and the characters that have subsequently played out the still unfinished story of modern and contemporary consciousness. If these realms are so distinct, how can the mental affect the physical? On the other hand, if the mental is conditioned by the physical, how is free will possible? How can physical states of the brain account for such phenomenologically distinct states as mental ones? How can it be shown that accessible third person descriptions of physical facts are descriptions of inaccessible first person mental states? <br><br> As a result of developments in clinical psychology and neuroscience, the dominant trend throughout most of the 20th century has been to explain the nature of consciousness, not in terms of a dualism, but rather in terms of different sorts of materialism. Consciousness here is either reduced to, identified with, or caused by, brain states or neural connections. These various explanations converge on the basic point of making the brain a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness. However, a number of criticisms have been made of these forms of materialism. For example, if being in pain is identical to being in a certain brain state, why can’t the person in pain identify such a brain state? If the brain causes the mental state of anger, how can two such different conditions be related? Moreover, that the brain is in a certain state or neurons are connected in a determined way does not seem to explain how one feels what one feels. As Steven Harnard writes: <br><br>
	<blockquote>Now what about the ‘how’? How does a pattern of brain activity generate feeling? This is not a question about how that pattern of brain activity is generated, for that can be explained in the usual way, just as we explain how a pattern of activity in a car or a kidney is generated. It is a question about how feeling itself is generated. Otherwise the feeling just remains something that is mysteriously (but reliably) correlated with certain brain patterns. We don’t know how brain activity could generate feeling. Even less do we know why. (2005)</blockquote>		<blockquote>Now what about the ‘how’? How does a pattern of brain activity generate feeling? This is not a question about how that pattern of brain activity is generated, for that can be explained in the usual way, just as we explain how a pattern of activity in a car or a kidney is generated. It is a question about how feeling itself is generated. Otherwise the feeling just remains something that is mysteriously (but reliably) correlated with certain brain patterns. We don’t know how brain activity could generate feeling. Even less do we know why. (2005)</blockquote>
	<br>Amid these puzzles, Colin McGinn (1993) has put forward a quite challenging argument. McGinn admits that as far as consciousness is concerned he is a naturalist. Basically, he has no doubt the brain is the causal basis of consciousness. The problem is we do not seem to understand ‘how this can be so’. The distinctive point of McGinn’s stance is that he believes we cannot determine how it is that the brain is responsible for consciousness. According to him, we are precluded from ever understanding this link given the way we form our concepts and develop our theories (1993: 2-3). <br><br> This does not mean McGinn is a constructivist. He actually holds a realist conception of the world, although he admits we have to have a cognitive and perceptive closure to understand it all. For him, there is a state of affairs in the world that human beings can neither perceive properly nor understand. ‘But such closure does not reflect adversely on the reality of the properties that lie outside the representational capacities in question; a property is no less real for not being reachable from a certain kind of perceiving and conceiving mind’ (1993: 3). <br><br> What seems to be missing in the materialist account of consciousness, and in McGinn's 'cognitive and perceptive closure' argument, is an evolutionary and thus historical approach to consciousness. For those hegemonic materialist theories that were popular in the late Twentieth Century, and are still powerful today, the resolution of the question as to how the brain produces consciousness is a discrete and synchronic one. It is an issue that can be resolved by pointing to brain states or complex neural connections. This is apparent from the spread of representations of the brain through Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Electroencephalography (EEG). Every now and again a digitally produced image of the brain presented in the media claims to be showing where consciousness, language, pain or love take place. <br><br> What is misleading about this particulate kind of image is the way consciousness is represented as static: as if it is detached from the environment and has not changed in the course of human evolution. It is as though being conscious has always activated the same parts of the brain. This representation leaves aside the fact that consciousness has evolved biologically and interacted socially and technologically with the environment. <br><br> Consequently, a diachronic and contextual approach must be stressed in order to make sense of the complexity of consciousness. There has been some very insightful work done in this field. For instance, Merlin Donald (1991) has argued that the evolution of consciousness has gone through at least three stages and, more to the point, that we have come to accumulate the three of them. That is, we normally switch between different states that can be regarded as conscious: <br><br>		<br>Amid these puzzles, Colin McGinn (1993) has put forward a quite challenging argument. McGinn admits that as far as consciousness is concerned he is a naturalist. Basically, he has no doubt the brain is the causal basis of consciousness. The problem is we do not seem to understand ‘how this can be so’. The distinctive point of McGinn’s stance is that he believes we cannot determine how it is that the brain is responsible for consciousness. According to him, we are precluded from ever understanding this link given the way we form our concepts and develop our theories (1993: 2-3). <br><br> This does not mean McGinn is a constructivist. He actually holds a realist conception of the world, although he admits we have to have a cognitive and perceptive closure to understand it all. For him, there is a state of affairs in the world that human beings can neither perceive properly nor understand. ‘But such closure does not reflect adversely on the reality of the properties that lie outside the representational capacities in question; a property is no less real for not being reachable from a certain kind of perceiving and conceiving mind’ (1993: 3). <br><br> What seems to be missing in the materialist account of consciousness, and in McGinn's 'cognitive and perceptive closure' argument, is an evolutionary and thus historical approach to consciousness. For those hegemonic materialist theories that were popular in the late Twentieth Century, and are still powerful today, the resolution of the question as to how the brain produces consciousness is a discrete and synchronic one. It is an issue that can be resolved by pointing to brain states or complex neural connections. This is apparent from the spread of representations of the brain through Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Electroencephalography (EEG). Every now and again a digitally produced image of the brain presented in the media claims to be showing where consciousness, language, pain or love take place. <br><br> What is misleading about this particulate kind of image is the way consciousness is represented as static: as if it is detached from the environment and has not changed in the course of human evolution. It is as though being conscious has always activated the same parts of the brain. This representation leaves aside the fact that consciousness has evolved biologically and interacted socially and technologically with the environment. <br><br> Consequently, a diachronic and contextual approach must be stressed in order to make sense of the complexity of consciousness. There has been some very insightful work done in this field. For instance, Merlin Donald (1991) has argued that the evolution of consciousness has gone through at least three stages and, more to the point, that we have come to accumulate the three of them. That is, we normally switch between different states that can be regarded as conscious: <br><br>

Joanna at 19:20, 14 September 2011

2011-09-14T19:20:37Z

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Joanna at 19:18, 14 September 2011

2011-09-14T19:18:05Z

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